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A STEP TOWARD AUTOMATIC COMMITMENT
FOR UNFIT DEFENDANTS -PEOPLE v. LANG
The State of Illinois recognizes different standards for both determining
unfitness to stand trial' and involuntary commitment, 2 resulting in a
number of perplexing problems for the judicial system. 3 A person who has
been indicted for a crime and subsequently found unfit to stand trial does
not necessarily satisfy the more extreme requirements for civil commit-
ment. 4 Because the state lacks statutory authority to detain such a defen-
dant by incarceration or commitment, 5 its only alternative is to release this
potentially dangerous individual into society. The nature of this dilemma is
illustrated by Illinois' fourteen-year struggle to reconcile its unfitness and
commitment procedures in an effort to accommodate Donald Lang, an illit-
erate deaf mute who was twice charged with murder but was determined to
be unfit to stand trial. The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Lang,6
solved the dilemma by holding that all persons found to be unfit to stand
trial, other than those whose unfitness is due to a solely physical condition,
shall be classified as mentally ill. 7 Pursuant to the new Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities (MHDD) Code, 8 a finding of both mental illness
and dangerousness is essential for civil commitment. 9 As a result of the
Lang decision, however, all unfit defendants other than those with purely
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(a) (1977). A defendant is unfit to stand trial if a
mental or physical condition renders him or her unable to understand the nature and purpose of
the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense. Id.
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978). A person will be committed involuntar-
ily if he or she is mentally ill and is either expected to inflict physical harm on himself or herself
or another, or is unable to provide for personal physical needs. id.
3. People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d 311, 324, 391 N.E.2d 350, 355 (1979). See also People v.
Ealy, 49 I11. App. 3d 922, 929, 365 N.E.2d 149, 154 (1st Dist. 1977).
4. E.g., People v. Ealy, 49 I11. App. 3d 922, 365 N.E.2d 149 (1st Dist. 1977) (a deaf mute
defendant was found unfit for trial but uncommittable under the Mental Health Code); People
ex. rel. Martin v. Strayhorn, 62 Ill. 2d 296, 309 N.E.2d 733 (1976) (an unfit defendant was
determined uncommittable under the Mental Health Code). See generally Note, Between Un-
fitness and Commitment: Difficulties in the Disposition of Unfit Defendants in Illinois, 9 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 905 (1976).
5. To assure the administration of due process, trial, conviction, and sentencing are prohib-
ited when a defendant is determined to be unfit. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(a) (1977).
See notes 15-17 and accompanying text infra. The defendant, therefore, must either be civilly
committed under the authority and criteria set forth in the present civil commitment statute or
be released on bail or recognizance. Id. § 1005-2-2(a). See note 17 infra.
6. 76 I11. 2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979).
7. Id. at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
8. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 §§ 1-100 to 6-107 (Supp. 1978) [hereinafter cited as MHDD
Code]. The MHDD Code replaced the Mental Health Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 1-1
to 20-1 (1977).
9. ILL. Rev. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978). See notes 20-24 and accompanying text
infra.
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physical disabilities, will be committed solely upon a finding of dangerous-
ness. 10
Development of the law dealing with unfit defendants and its relationship
to the civil commitment procedure are examined in this Note. An analysis of
the Lang court's rationale and criticism of both the court's reliance on the
legislative intent underlying the new civil commitment statute and its shift
in emphasis from the mental illness to the dangerousness requirement is
submitted. It is suggested that the court's interpretation of the term "men-
tally ill" as used in the MHDD Code may constitute equal protection and
due process violations. Finally, the impact of the Lang decision and sugges-
tions for radical reform in the laws pertaining to unfit defendants are pre-
sented.
BACKGROUND
Illinois' Unfitness and Civil Commitment Provisions
The United States Supreme Court has held that trying and sentencing an
incompetent 11 defendant violates the due process clause. 12 Incompetency
refers to a defendant's ability to consult with his or her attorney with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and also to have a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings. 13 Most states, including Illinois,
have incorporated this test for incompetency into their unfitness statutes. 14
Under Illinois' present statutory scheme, a defendant is unfit to stand trial
if a mental or physical condition renders the individual unable to understand
10. 76 Ill. 2d at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 357.
11. For purposes of this Note, the term "incompetency" will be used interchangeably with
the term "'unfitness to stand trial."
12. Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956) (per curiam). In Youtsey v. United States,
97 F. 937, 940-46 (6th Cir. 1899), the common law authorities for the incompetency rule were
set forth. See also Annot., 3 A.L.R. 94 (1919). For a discussion of the history of the doctrine see
Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REv. 454, 457-59 (1967); Note, The Identifica-
tion of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Unfit for Adversary Combat from Those Who
Are Fit, 66 Ky. L.J. 666, 668-73 (1978).
Illinois courts also have held that trying an unfit defendant violates due process. People v.
McCullum, 66 111. 2d 306, 362 N.E.2d 307 (1977); People v. Burson, 11 111. 2d 360, 143 N.E.2d
239 (1957); People v. Reaves, 421 I11. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952); People v. Salvaggio, 38 I11.
App. 3d 482, 348 N.E.2d 243 (1st Dist. 1976); People v. Johnson, 15 I11. App. 3d 680, 304
N.E.2d 688 (1st Dist. 1973).
13. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.
162, 172 (1975). See generally Pizzi, Competency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual
and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 21 (1977).
In Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1965), the court, while considering a petition for
habeas corpus, used the federal standard for incompetency rather than the state's criterion.
Thus, the Dusky standard is presumed to express the minimum constitutional standard for un-
fitness. Gobert, Competency to Stand Trial: A Pre- and Post-Jackson Analysis, 40 TENN. L.
REv. 659, 660 n. 10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gobert].
14. For citations to these statutes see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DIs-
ABLED AND THE LAw 410 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brakel &
Rock].
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the nature and purpose of the proceedings or to assist in the defense. 15 The
unfitness statute further requires the court to order a hearing to determine if
the unfit defendant should be hospitalized in accordance with the civil com-
mitment statute. 16 If the defendant is not hospitalized, the court must
order a release on bail or recognizance. 17
Prior to January 1, 1979, an Illinois citizen could be committed involuntar-
ily only if the requirements set forth in the Mental Health Code were
met. 18 A person was subject to commitment, classifed as "in need of men-
tal treatment," if he or she was afflicted with a mental disorder and, as a
result of that disorder, was expected physically to injure himself or herself or
another, or was unable to provide for personal physical needs. 19
Under the new civil commitment statute, the MHDD Code, 20 a person
will be committed involuntarily if he or she is mentally ill rather than
15. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(a) (1977). Prior to January 1, 1973, a defendant was
classified as incompetent to stand trial, rather than unfit, if solely a mental condition rendered
the defendant unable to understand-or-assist. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-1 (1969) (current
version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(a) (1977)).
The present unfitness statute, supra note 1, replaced the term "competence to stand trial"
with "fitness." The latter term refers only to a person's ability to function within the context of a
trial. Council Commentary, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 (Smith-Hurd) (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Council Commentary]. Competency, on the other hand, is a mental health term
used when determining if commitment is necessary. Id. Furthermore, the term competency
excludes physical fitness. Id.
The question of a defendant's fitness can be raised before or during the trial by either the
state, the defendant, or the court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(b) (1977). If raised be-
fore, the question is determined by either the court or a jury upon a motion by either the
defendant, the state, or the judge; if the question is raised after the trial has commenced, the
court decides. Id. § 1005-2-1(d). If requested by the state or the defendant, the court shall
appoint expert(s) to examine the individual and testify regarding the defendant's fitness. Id.
§ 1005-2-1(g). The party raising the question has the burden of going forward with the evidence.
If the court raises the question, the state must carry the burden. Id. § 10 0 5 -2 -10). This latter
provision has been held to be unconstitutional to the extent that it places the ultimate burden
on the defendant to prove his or her unfitness. People v. McCullum, 66 I11. 2d 306, 362 N.E.2d
307 (1977). See generally Note, Illinois Fitness for Trial: Processes, Paradoxes, Proposals, 6
Loy. CHI. L.J. 678 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Fitness for Trial].
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a) (1977).
17. Id. The Unified Code of Corrections provides that if a defendant is not hospitalized
pursuant to the commitment hearing, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities must petition the trial court to release him or her on bail or recognizance. Id. A
court, however, may impose conditions on his or her release that it finds appropriate. People ex
rel. Martin v. Strayhorn, 62 I11. 2d 296, 301-02, 342 N.E.2d 5, 8-9 (1976). See also People v.
Dublin, 63 I11. App. 3d 387, 380 N.E.2d 31 (2d Dist. 1978); People v. Patterson, 54 I11. App. 3d
931, 370 N.E.2d 819 (1st Dist. 1977); People v. Theim, 52 I11. App. 3d 160, 367 N.E.2d 267
(1st Dist. 1977). Nevertheless, a court may not 'set excessively high bail on the belief that the
unfit defendant is dangerous. People v. Ealy, 49 II1. App. 3d 922, 930-34, 365 N.E.2d 147,
155-57 (1st Dist. 1977).
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (1977) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §
1-119 (Supp. 1978)).
19. Id.
20. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 1-100 to 6-107 (Supp. 1978).
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afflicted with a mental disorder. 21 In addition, that person must be danger-
ous, 22 a criterion similar to that used in the Mental Health Code. The
"dangerous" requirement is satisfied if, as a result of the mental illness, a
person is expected to inflict physical harm upon himself or herself or
another, or is unable to provide for personal physical needs. 23 In other
words, one who is mentally ill and dangerous as described by the MHDD
Code will be classified as a person subject to involuntary commitment. 24
Prior United States Supreme Court Cases
Dealing with Unfitness and Corninitment
Prior to 1972, most jurisdictions, including Illinois, 25 automatically com-
mitted all unfit defendants to a mental institution until competency was re-
stored. 26 This practice was highly criticized because defendants often were
confined for a substantially longer period than they would have been if they
had been tried and sentenced. 27 Furthermore, in many states, time spent
in an institution did not proportionately reduce any subsequent sentence the
defendant may have received upon attaining fitness. 28
As a result, the United States Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Indiana, 29
held these automatic commitment procedures violative of the equal protec-
21. id. § 1-119.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25, Prior to January 1, 1973, Illinois' unfitness statute provided that incompetent defendants
be committed to the Department of Mental Health during the continuance of that condition.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-3 (1969) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2
(1977)).
26. See Gobert, supra note 13, at 662.
27. See People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 323, 391 N.E.2d at 354, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 76-77 (A. Matthews 1970) [hereinafter cited as
Matthews]; B. ENNIs, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY, chs. 1-3 (1972).
In order to avoid the possibility of a life sentence in a mental institution, the defendant's
attorney may fail to raise the issue of unfitness. Lang's attorney offered to waive Lang's right not
to be tried while unfit in order to avoid indefinite commitment that the defense believed would
result in a life sentence. People v. Lang, 76 Ill. 2d at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351. Logically,
though, one cannot say that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial but capable of knowingly
waiving his or her right to have the court determine capacity to stand trial. Pate v. Robinson,
383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966). See generally Gobert, supra note 13, at 662-67.
28. Matthews, supra note 27, at 76. Illinois, unlike the majority of jurisdictions, credited a
defendant with time spent in an institution against any subsequent sentence imposed for the
crime for which the defendant had been indicted. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-3 (1970)
(current version at ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 38, § 1005-2-2(c) (1977)). See People v. Spears, 63 I11.
App. 3d 510, 380 N.E.2d 423 (5th Dist. 1978); People v. Williams, 23 II1. App. 3d 127, 318
N.E.2d 692 (5th Dist. 1974).
29. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). The Jackson case involved a mentally defective deaf mute who was
incapable of communication except through limited sign language. He had been found unfit to
stand trial for two robbery indictments. Evidence established that the defendant would probably
never attain competency. Id. at 719. As a result of his unfitness, Jackson had been automatically
committed under Indiana's criminal commitment statute. Pursuant to this provision, he was to
have been confined in a mental institution until sanity was restored. Id. at 717-19.
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tion and due process clauses of the United States Constitution. The Court
found that the equal protection clause requires that unfit defendants be
committed and released pursuant to the same standards and procedures as
those employed for all other citizens. .o It noted that criminal charges alone
cannot justify less substantive and procedural protection against indefinite
commitment than that available to all others. 31 The Jackson Court further
held that the due process clause forbids detention of a person solely because
he or she is unfit to stand trial, 3 2 but permits detention of an unfit defen-
dant for a reasonable period of time to determine if there is a substantial
probability that he or she will attain the capacity necessary to stand trial in
the near future.3 3 If the defendant will not become fit to stand trial in the
foreseeable future, the state must either civilly commit him or her as it
would any other citizen, or it must release the unfit defendant. 34 Finally,
Jackson held that the due process clause mandates that the nature and dura-
tion of commitment be reasonably related to the purpose for which the indi-
vidual is committed 3 5 and demanded that any commitment be justified by
progress toward the goal of fitness. 36
These due process requirements suggest that there may be a constitutional
right to treatment for persons involuntarily committed. 37 Proponents of this
right allege that an institutionalized person must be given appropriate treat-
ment for the condition for which he or she was compulsorily committed 3 8
For a discussion of the Jackson case, see generally Gobert, supra note 13; Note Pretrial
Mental Commitment of the Accused, 33 LA L. REv. 456 (1973); Note, Remedies for Individuals
Wrongly Detained in State Mental Institutions Because of Their Incompetency to Stand Trial:
Implementing Jackson v. Indiana, 7 VAL. U. L. Rhv. 203 (1973).
30. 406 U.S. at 730. The Court noted that Jackson might not have been committable under
Indiana's civil commitment standards. Furthermore, it was unconstitutionasl to subject the de-
fendant to more stringent release criteria than the civil counterpart. Id. at 727-29.
31. Id. at 724. The Jackson Court relied on Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12
(1966), which held that no conceivable basis exists for distinguishing the commitment of a per-
son who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments. 406 U.S. at
723-24.
32. 406 U.S. at 731.
33. Id. at 738. The Court referred to this as the rule of reasonableness developed by
Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956), and subsequent lower federal court deci-
sions. 406 U.S. at 732-33. Neither Jackson nor Illinois' unfitness provision specified what length
of time would be reasonable. But see ILLINOIS JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, Report 42 (1976) (rec-
ommending that a court conduct a hearing within thirty days of the entry of an order finding
unfitness to determine the probability that the defendant will attain fitness within one year)
[hereinafter cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
34. 406 U.S. at 738.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses form the basis of arguments
in support of this right. Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325
F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 2 MENTAL DISA-
BILITY LAW REPORTER 108-17, 625-26 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MDLR].
38. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); 4 PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, TASK PANEL REPORT 1420-30 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK
PANEL REPORT]; COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, NATIONAL ASS'N OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1976).
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and that a person may not be comitted in the absence of available effective
treatment .3 The United States Supreme Court, in O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 40 declined to decide whether Jackson ensured mentally ill per-
sons a constitutional right to treatment. 41 The Court did hold, however,
that a state may no longer civilly commit a person solely on a finding of
mental illness. 42 The question concerning what other requirement(s) must
be satisfied in order constitutionally to commit a citizen was left unanswered
in Donaldson.43 Lower federal court decisions, however, have suggested
that a finding of dangerousness may be necessary .4 This is the legal cli-
mate that the Illinois Supreme Court encountered when deciding People v.
Lang. 45
PEOPLE V. LANG
Lang's Unique Encounter with the Illinois Judicial System
In 1965, Donald Lang was indicted for murder 4 6 and, subsequently, found
unfit to stand trial because of a permanent mental and physical impair-
ment. 47 As a result of this determination, he was institutionalized indef-
39. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 738, demands that a person's continued commitment be
justified toward the goal of fitness. See also the materials cited at note 38 supra.
40. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
41. Id. at 573.
42. Id. at 575. Donaldson had been committed as a paranoid schizophrenic for fifteen years
in a Florida state mental hospital for care, maintenance, and treatment. There was evidence
that the patient was not a danger to others. Evidence also showed that his commitment offered
an enforced custodial care rather than a program designed to alleviate or cure his illness. De-
spite his requests to be released and the hospital's authority to do so, the hospital superinten-
dent refused to release him. Id. at 565-69.
For a further discussion of Donaldson see generally Note, O'Connor v. Donaldson: The Su-
preme Court Sidesteps the Right to Treatment, 13 CALIF. W. L. REv. 168 (1976); Note, O'Con-
nor v. Donaldson: Due Process and the Involuntarily Civilly Committed Mental Patient, 11
TULSA L.J. 604 (1976); Comment, O'Connor v. Donaldson: Due Process Rights of Mental Pa-
tients in State Hospitals, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. Soc. CH. 65 (1976).
43. The Court expressly declined to decide whether, when, or by what procedures a state
may commit a citizen. In addition, the Court did not specify if the grounds generally advanced
by contemporary statutes could justify commitment. These grounds included prevention of in-
jury to others, insurance of the patient's survival and safety, and treatment of the illness. 422
U.S. at 573-74.
44. In response to attacks on various states' commitment statutes for vagueness, lower fed-
eral courts have upheld these statutes by requiring a finding of dangerousness. Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb.
1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972). These cases are discussed in Comment, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a
Constitutional Requirement for Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Il1, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 562 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Overt Dangerous Behavior], In addition, the Jackson
Court interpreted Indiana's commitment statute to require dangerousness as a basis for com-
mitment. 406 U.S. at 728.
45. 76 Ill. 2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979).
46. Id. at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351.
47. Pursuant to a hearing on the issue of Lang's physical competency, the jury returned a
verdict holding the defendant incompetent to stand trial. People v. Lang, 376 I11. 2d 75, 77, 224
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initely under the authority of the former unfitness statute providing for au-
tomatic commitment until competency was attained 48 Seeking Lang's re-
lease, his attorney filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending
that a person cannot be imprisoned for life without having been convicted at
a trial. 49 In People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs,50 the Illinois Supreme Court
granted the relief requested in Lang's petition 5' and held that, despite a
defendant's handicaps, a person facing indefinite commitment should be
given the opportunity to have his or her guilt or innocence determined. 52
Consequently, Lang's case was remanded for trial, 5 3 but the charges were
dismissed because of the death of the principal witness. 5
Within six months of his release, Lang was charged with a second mur-
der. 55 Under the Myers rationale, the defendant was granted another trial
in which he was convicted and sentenced to fourteen to twenty-five years
imprisonment. 56 The appellate court reversed the conviction, stating that
no trial procedures could effectively compensate for Lang's particular hand-
icaps. 5 7  Thereafter, at a fitness hearing, the trial court found Lang unfit to
stand trial. 58 At a commitment hearing, however, the trial judge concluded
that Lang was not in need of mental treatment and, therefore, was not sub-
ject to civil commitment. 59 Pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections,
N.E.2d 838, 839 (1967). At the request of the State's Attorney, another hearing was held in
which the defendant was determined also to be mentally incompetent. Id. at 78-79, 224 N.E.2d
at 840.
48. 76 I11. 2d at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351. The statute in effect at the time of the incompe-
tency verdicts provided for automatic commitment upon the determination of a defendant's
unfitness to a mental health facility until competency was attained. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §
104-3(a) (1967) (current version at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(a) (1977)).
49. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 II1. 2d 281, 284-85, 263 N.E.2d 109, 111-12 (1970).
50. 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970).
51. id. at 285, 263 N'.E.2d at 112.
52. Id. at 288, 263 N.E.2d at 113. The court primarily relied on Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967), which held that indefinitely postponing a criminal prosecution violates the
sixth and fourteenth amendments, and Regina v. Roberts, [1953] 2 All E.R. 340, in which the
court awarded an unfit deaf mute defendant a trial in which the defense attorney believed he
could obtain a verdict of not guilty. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d at 286-88, 263
N.E.2d at 112-13. The Myers court held that it must grant an unfit defendant the opportunity
to establish his or her innocence to avoid the "grave injustice of detaining as a criminal lunatic a
man who was innocent .... .. Id. at 288, 243 N.E.2d at 113, quoting Regina v. Roberts, [19531,
2 All E.R. 340. The Myers court further held that the trial of a handicapped defendant should
provide him or her with compensating procedures to insure constitutional rights. Id. at 287, 263
N.E.2d at 113.
53. 76 Ill. 2d at 317, 391 N.E.2d at 351.
54. Id.
55. Id. The facts of the second murder were similar to those of the first murder.
56. 76 III. 2d at 318, 391 N.E.2d at 352.
57. People v. Lang, 26 I11. App. 3d 648, 653, 325 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1st Dist. 1975).
58. 76 111. 2d at 318, 391 N.E.2d at 352.
59. People v. Lang, 62 I11. App. 3d 688, 692, 378 N.E.2d 1106, 1111 (1st Dist. 1978).
Lengthy hearings were conducted to ascertain whether the defendant's mental state required
confinement tinder the civil commitment standard. Three expert witnesses testified that Lang
was mentally retarded and likely to be dangerous to himself or others in the future. Id. at
1980]
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the court imposed conditions for bail and ordered that Lang continue in a
training program and reside in a secure setting. 60
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the public defender contended
that because Lang could not be tried, civilly committed, or meet the impos-
sible conditions of bail, the charges should be dismissed. 61 The State's At-
torney responded that the defendant presented a serious danger to society
and should be detained. 62 On the other hand, Lang's conservator sought a
writ of mandamus compelling the Department of Mental Health and De-
velopmental Disabilities to accept the defendant for voluntary admission. 63
The Department, however, claimed that it lacked statutory authority to treat
persons who were not in need of mental treatment. 64 In response to the
various requests advanced by the State's Attorney, Lang's conservator, and
the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, the Il-
linois Supreme Court decided People v. Lang.
The Decision
In People v. Lang, 65 the Illinois Supreme Court resolved the problem of
determining the disposition of unfit defendants who are not subject to civil
commitment. It held that all unfit defendants, other than those found unfit
solely by reason of a physical condition, shall be considered mentally ill.66
To reach its decision, the Lang court primarily relied on the enactment of
the new civil commitment provision and the legislative intent underlying
this new statute.67 The court further justified its decision by noting its
699-700, 378 N.E.2d at 1116. The public defender, on the other hand, produced experts who
did not diagnose the defendant as mentally retarded or mentally ill, but of average to bright
intelligence and capable of standing trial in three to five years. 76 Ill. 2d at 321-22, 391 N.E.2d
at 353. In fact, it was argued that the defendant had recently made noticeable progress in
learning sign language. Id. at 321, 391 N.E.2d at 354.
60. 76 I11. 2d at 320, 391 N.E.2d at 353. Lang was discharged from the Department facility
and placed in jail where he remained without any training. The Director of the Department was
ordered in a writ of mandamus to create and implement an adequate treatment program for the
defendant. Id.
On appeal, the court, relying on People v. Ealy, 49 I11. App. 3d 922, 937-38, 365 N.E.2d
149, 159-60 (1st Dist. 1977), concluded that a court had no authority to order the Department
to detain an unfit, uncommittable defendant. People v. Lang, 62 Ill. App. 3d at 698-99, 378
N.E.2d at 1115. The appellate court also stated that the trial court did not have the power to
order the Department to develop a training program for the defendant. Id. at 704, 378 N.E.2d
at 1119. Therefore, the court concluded, the county jail is the only place for such a defendant
who is awaiting the outcome of his bail hearing. Id. at 702, 378 N.E.2d at 1118.
61. 76 I11. 2d at 321, 391 N.E.2d at 353. Lang's conservator claimed that he was unable to
locate a training program that would accept the defendant because of the pending murder
charges or to persuade the Department to provide treatment. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 76 II1. 2d 311, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979).
66. Id. at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 356. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
67. Id. at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
[Vol. 29:673
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compliance with the dictates of Jackson,68 and the protection of defendants'
rights by procedural safeguards provided in the commitment and unfitness
statutes. 69 Nevertheless, the decision may be criticized for its failure to
adhere to the legislative intent and for its possible equal protection and due
process violations.
1. The Court's Use of Legislative Intent
In reaching its decision, the Lang court first had to close the gap between
the commitment and the unfitness standards. 70 To achieve this, the court
essentially relied on the enactment of a new civil commitment provision, the
MHDD Code,71 and the legislative intent underlying this statute.72 The
court noted that, in the past, the problem of an unfit but uncommittable
defendant resulted from a finding that he or she was not afflicted with a
mental disorder. 73 This conflict, the court reasoned, had been alleviated by
the MHDD Code and its requirement that a person suffer from a mental
illness 74 rather than from a mental disorder. 75 Therefore, it was unneces-
sary for the court to utilize different standards for determining unfitness to
stand trial and mental illness. 76
The court relied on the legislative intent recorded in the Report of the
Governor's Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois
(Report). 77 The court noted that the Report specifically indicated that the
Commission had left the term "mentally ill" undefined so that courts could
formulate a definition on a case-by-case basis to avoid a broad or circular
definition. 7 Given this authority, the Lang court construed the term to
encompass all unfit defendants except persons whose only handicap is physi-
cal. 79
In essence, the Lang court has insured that virtually all unfit defendants
will be classified as mentally ill for commitment purposes unless their hand-
68. Id. at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 356-57.
69. Id. at 328-30, 391 N.E.2d at 357.
70. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 1-100 to 6-107 (Supp. 1978).
72. 76 Ill. 2d at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
73. Id. at 324, 391 N.E.2d at 355. See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978).
75. 76 Ill. 2d at 326-27, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
76. Id. at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
77. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR THE REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF IL-
LINOIS, REPORT (1976) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
78. 76 Ill. 2d at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 356. The Report provides that:
That term is left undefined as in prior codes, largely because any definition which
could be made legally explicit would necessarily be so broad or circular as to pre-
clude accurate application. By not providing an explicit statutory definition, a com-
mon law definition fashioned by the courts on a case-by-case basis is deemed to be
preferable as it has been in the past.
REPORT, supra note 77, at 14.
79. 76 Ill. 2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
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icap is purely physical. To establish this proposition, however, it first must
be noted that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized that it is difficult
and perhaps impossible to distinguish between physical and mental or
psychological handicaps. 80 Secondly, a well-trained psychiatrist "can ma-
nipulate any set of facts to sustain almost any conclusion" about a person. 81
Undoubtedly, therefore, the courts, armed with the ability to classify all
unfit defendants as mentally ill, will do so in an effort to avoid the type of
conflict that arose in Lang's situation. 82 If a court should fail to arrive at
this conclusion, it would find itself contradicting the Lang court's intention
to resolve the problem of determining the disposition of the unfit but un-
committable defendant. 83
Finally, the Lang court failed to consider that, in actuality, the new
MHDD Code was not intended to produce substantive changes in the civil
commitment standard. 8 4  Although the court noted8 5 that the Mental
Health Code required a person to be afflicted with a mental disorder, 86
while the MHDD Code mandates that the person be mentally ill,87 the
court did not explain how this change in the language, from disorder to
ill(ness), actually could have altered the standard. In fact, past judicial opin-
ions have suggested that the terms mental illness and mental disorder are
synonymous. 88 In addition, the Lang court failed to consider the language
in the Report indicating that a change in the substantive meaning of the
80. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 II1. 2d at 286, 263 N.E.2d at 112. Even the "experts"
who examined Lang disagreed on whether he was mentally defective. See note 59 supra.
81. Beis, Civil Commitment: Rights of the Mentally Disabled, Recent Developments and
Trends, 23 1)EPAUL L. RE'. 42, 78 (1973), quoting Hearings on Constitutional Rts. of the
Mentally Ill Before the Sen. Subcomin. on Constitutional Rts. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 305 (1970) (testimony of' Dr. Harold Kaufinan, Adjunct Professor of
Law and Psychiatry, Georgetown Univ.) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
82. One author has noted that a state will most likely stretch its civil commitment statute in
order to successfully confine an incompetent defendant. Burt & Morris, A Proposal for the
Abolition of the Incompetency Plea, 40 U. Ciii. L. REX'. 66, 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Burt
& Morris].
83. The court intended to resolve the question that has "heretofore confounded court and
counsel,'" that is, the disposition of the tnfit hut inconmittable defendant. 76 Ill. 2d at 328,
391 N.E.2d at 356. Unless the court were to find all unfit defendants to be mentally ill, the
problem would remain unsolved.
84. In the new commitment statute, the phrase -subject to involutarv admission- replaces
the phrase "in need of mental treatment." This change was made in order to avoid confusion
between the legal effects of classification and the common usage of the latter phrase. REPORT,
supra note 77, at 14.
85. 76 I11. 2(1 at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (1977).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978).
88. In In re Whitehouse, 56 111. App. 3(d 245, 371 N.E.2d 990 (5th Dist. 1977), the court
used the terms mental disorder and mental illness interchangeably. Although ordering commit-
inent under the Mental Health Code, the court, in In re Dukes, 57 111. App. 3d 618, 620, 373
N.E.2d 722, 724 (lst Dist. 1978), found that the person was suffering from a mental illness. See
also In re Garcia, 59 Ill. App. 3d 500, 375 N.E.2d 557 (lst Dist. 1978); In re Sciara, 21 Ill.
App. 3d 889, 316 N.E.2d 153 (lst Dist. 1974).
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question was not intended. 89 Clearly, the Lang court's rationale that the
state has been relieved of its burden to demonstrate an affliction with a
mental disorder contradicts this evidence and legislative intent.
2. Emphasis on the Dangerousness Requirement
Although both mental illness and dangerousness are mandated by the in-
voluntary commitment provision, 9 the Lang court shifted its emphasis to
what it believed to be the more important condition, that of dangerous-
ness. 91 The court noted that prior courts focused primarily on the nature of
the mental condition and failed to consider adequately the dangerousness
criterion. 92 Further, the court justified minimizing the importance of
litigating the exact nature of the defendant's mental condition by citing the
legislative removal of the phrase "afflicted with a mental disorder" from the
involuntary commitment statute. 93 Finally, the court relied on the United
States Supreme Court's holding in O'Connor v. Donaldson94 that mental
illness alone cannot constitutionally justify involuntary commitment. 95 The
Lang court reasoned, therefore, that focusing on the dangerousness re-
quirement would satisfy the mandate of Donaldson. 96
Rather than shifting the emphasis from the mental condition to the
dangerousness criterion, however, the Lang court has virtually eliminated
the mental illness requirement from the commitment standard for unfit de-
fendants. It has been noted that mental illness is, at best, a vague stan-
dard. 97 Therefore, it can be argued that a court should spend more time
and give more weight to the determination of dangerousness rather than
debating the exact nature of a mental condition. The Lang decision, how-
ever, does not produce this result despite its language limiting the holding
Many states define mental illness for civil commitment purposes as a psychiatric disorder or
as having a mental disease. For the various states' statutory definition of mental illness see
Brakel & Rock, supra note 14, at 66-71. IOWA CODE § 229.40 (1971) defines the term mental
illness so as to include every type of mental disease or mental disorder. Thus, many states treat
the two terms in question as if the have the same meaning.
89. The Commission Report has left the term mentally ill undefined as in prior codes in
order fir the court to form a definition on a case-by-case basis as it has in the past. REPORT,
supra note 77, at 14.
90. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
91. 76 I11. 2(1 at 325, 391 N.E.2d at 355. According to the Mental Health Code, the danger-
ousness criterion was satisfied if the person was reasonably expected to be a danger to himself
or herself or others. Id. The dangerousness reqjuirenient under the new \ HDD Code is basi-
callv the same. It requires that a person be reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm
upon himself or herself or another in the near future. Id. at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 356.
92. Id. at 324-25, 391 N.E.2d at 355.
93. Id. at 326, 391 N.E.2d at 355-56. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-11 (1977).
94. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
95. Id. at 585. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra.
96. 76 III. 2d at 325, 329, 391 N.E.2d at 355, 357.
97. Brakel & Rock, supra note 14, at 60.
1980]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:673
to defendants who are unfit due to other than a solely physical handicap. In
practice, virtually all unfit defendants may be committed under Lang upon
proof of dangerousness. 98 This interpretation is not only contrary to a plain
reading of the civil commitment statute, but also contrary to the case law on
which the court relies. 99
Furthermore, the dangerousness criterion is almost certain to be satisfied
by virtue of the indictment in the case of an unfit defendant. A prior Illinois
court stated that the crime for which the defendant is being held can be the
basis of the medical opinion that the person is dangerous. 100 It also has
been noted that the dangerousness criterion is little more than a vague stan-
dard. 101 Furthermore, dangerousness is usually overpredicted. 102 More
98. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
99. The Lang court primarily relied on O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), and
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In neither of these cases was the mental illness re-
quirement as defined in the respective civil commitment statute waived. In particular, Jackson
requires the state to establish that the defendant satisfies all the requirements mandated by the
civil commitment statute. id. at 727-28, 730.
100. People v. Sansone, 18 I11. App. 3d 315, 323, 309 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1st Dist. 1974)
(commitment must be based on explicit medical opinion regarding the patient's future conduct);
People v. Bradley, 22 III. App. 3d 1076, 1084, 318 N.E.2d 267, 273 (1st Dist. 1974) (criminal
charges may provide the basis for the medical opinion).
In Lang, the court justified the finding of dangerousness by stating that there is substantial
evidence of the defendant's dangerous traits. 76 Ill. 2d at 331, 391 N.E.2d at 358. The court
considered the brutality of the murder for which the defendant was being held and awaiting
trial as evidence of dangerousness. Id. The appellate court reversed Lang's conviction because
no trial procedures could compensate for his disabilities. See note 57 and accompanying text
supra. Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the trial established that he had
committed the murder. 76 111. 2d at 331, 391 N.E.2d at 358. Therefire, the conviction was used
as evidence to commit the defendant. This rationale conflicts with a prior Illinois court decision,
People v. Sanders, 59 111. App. 3d 650, 375 N.E.2d 921 (5th Dist. 1978), holding that a person
accused of' a crime has a right to a fair trial. More importantly, the Lang court's rationale
conflicts with the well known principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty, and the
Illinois Constitution that states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process. ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (1970).
Commentators, as well as a number of courts, have suggested that a finding of dangerousness
must be based on recent overt conduct or behavior. For a survey of existing law indicating this
proposition see Overt Dangerous Behavior, supra note 44; TASK PANEL REPORT, supra note 38,
at 1148-49; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 33, at 44-46.
A federal court, however, upheld Illinois' civil commitment statute despite the absence of a
requirement of an overt act, omission, or threat to predict dangerousness. United States ex rel.
Nelson, 46t F. Supp. 707 (N.D. II. 1978). Cf. Lessard '. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093
(E. 1). Wis. 1972) (finding of' dangerousness based upon a recent overt act, attempt, or threat).
101. Psychiatrists reach their conclusions about dangerousness, diagnoses, need for treat-
ment, and mental illness through vague and subjective standards. A psychiatrist "can nanipu-
late any set of facts to sustain almost any conclusion about people that they examine." Hearings,
supra note 81, at 305. Furthermore, these experts often are confused about the content of the
legal standard and the purpose for the examination. Matthews, supra note 27, at 85. For a
discussion of the role of psychiatric experts in commitment proceedings see note Ill infra.
102. The trial judge, in People v. Ealy, 49 I11. App. 3d 922, 365 N.E.2d 149 (1st Dist. 1977),
noted that a court will believe a doctor who sa s a man is dangerous despite testimnony from
another doctor who savs that the same person is not dangerous. Id. at 927, 365 N.E.2d at 153
(emphasis in original).
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importantly, the Lang court suggested that unless a defendant proves his or
her innocence at an "innocent only" hearing, the attending criminal offense
can establish dangerousness for involuntary commitment purposes. 103
Therefore, the Lang court has added support to the proposition that unfit
defendants can be found dangerous by reason of the criminal charge.
3. Compliance with Jackson
The Lang court reasoned that its interpretation of the commitment provi-
sion complied with the dictates of Jackson v. Indiana. 104 The Lang court
noted that its decision will not cause a defendant to be held indefinitely
solely because he or she is found unfit to stand trial. 105 It stated that if a
court establishes that a defendant is both dangerous and unfit by reason of a
condition that is not solely physical, he or she will be committed according
to the provisions of the civil commitment statute. 106 Without such a de-
termination, the court added, the defendant would be released: 107
It appears, however, that the Lang decision violates the equal protection
and due process requirements as set forth in Jackson. First, Jackson inter-
preted the equal protection clause as a demand that unfit defendants be
committed and released pursuant to the same standards and procedures as
those employed for all other citizens. 108 The Lang decision, on the other
hand, allows courts to apply different standards to commit two classes of
people-one standard to commit those accused of committing a crime and
another standard for all other persons. The mental illness requirement must
be established for the latter group by the standards set forth in the MHDD
Code. 109 For the former class, however, the mental illness criterion can be
satisfied by establishing that the defendant is unfit, a different standard than
that set forth in the Unified Code of Corrections. 110 In addition, the Lang
court permits different procedures to be utilized to commit these two clases
of persons. While the mental condition of persons who have not been ac-
cused of committing a crime is determined at a commitment hearing where
a qualified expert must testify as to that person's mental health,"' an unfit
Overt Dangerous Behavior, supra note 44, at 583 n.90, cites a study finding that future
dangerous behavior can he accurately predicted at a rate of approximately thirty-five percent.
See generally Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presiomption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693 (1974); R. Shlenskv, Constitutional Problem with Mental
Commitmen t in Illinois, 62 I. B.J. 552 (1974): J. Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1972).
103. 76 Ill. 2d at 330, 391 N.E.2d at 358.
104. Id. at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 356-57.
105. id.
106. /d.
107. Id.
108. 406 U.S. at 730.
109. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 1-119 (Supp. 1978).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(a) (1977).
111. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 91 , § 3-807 (Supp. 1978). See MDLR, supra note 37, at 625 (a
California study "revealed that a majority of judges classified their function in civil commitment
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defendant is said to be mentally ill. without having been given a commitment
hearing112 and possibly without an expert's examination and subsequent tes-
timony as to his or her mental health. 113 More importantly, an unfit
defendant who has been accused of committing a violent crime is certain to
be classified as mentally ill 114 and dangerous, 115 unlike his or her civil coun-
terpart. Thus, because criminal charges alone cannot justify less substantive
and procedural protection against indefinite commitment than that available
to all others, 116 the Lang decision violates the equal protection clause.
Secondly, Lang violates the due process mandates that an unfit defendant
cannot be held solely as a result of his or her unfitness 117 and that the
nature and duration of the commitment must be reasonably related to the
purpose for which the individual is committed. 118 Pursuant to the Lang
decision, a person can be committed solely as a result of an indictment and a
subsequent determination of unfitness to stand trial. 119 This sequence of
events parallels the statutory scheme that was held unconstitutional in
Jackson. 120 In addition, the Lang court demands involuntary commitment
regardless of the Jackson requirement that commitment be justified by prog-
ress toward the goal of fitness 121 or be reasonably related to the purpose for
which the person is committed. The ruling encompasses and facilitates the
commitment of permanently handicapped individuals, regardless of the fact
that attempts to correct the condition would be futile. 122 Jackson and the
proceedings as a 'rubber stamp'). See id. at 625 n.76 (studies have been found that "jurors
almost never find contrary to the opinion of the 'impartial' psychiatrist witness").
In the civil commitment hearing, a finding of mental illness must be based upon medical
opinion. People v. Sansone, 18 Ill. App. 3d at 323, 309 N.E.2d at 739. See, e.g., In re Doe, 56
ll. App. 3d 1052, 1057, 372 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1st Dist. 1978); People v. Williams, 47 II1. App.
3d 861, 869, 365 N.E.2d 404, 411 (1st Dist. 1977); In re Sciara, 21 I11. App. 3d at 897, 316
N.E.2d at 158.
112. The defendant is given a hearing to determine if he or she is fit to stand trial. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1 (1977). If the individual is found to be unfit other than for a solely
physical condition, he or she is automatically presumed to be mentally ill under the rationale of
Lang. 76 Ill. 2d at 327, 391 N.E.2d at 356. Thus, this issue is not relitigated and decided by a
jury at a commitment hearing.
113. The defendant is examined by an expert only upon the request of the state or the
defendant. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(g) (1977). Thus, it is conceivable that the defend-
ant will be classified as unfit without an expert's examination and testimony that his or her
unfitness does not result from a solely physical disorder. Cf note 111 supra.
114. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
115. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
116. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 724.
117. Id. at 731.
118. Id. at 738. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Instit., 407 U.S. 245, 250 (1972).
119. See notes 80-83, 100-03, and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 25-36 and accompanying text supra.
121. To commit an unfit defendant, no consideration is given to the likelihood that he or she
will attain fitness. See 76 I11. 2d at 328, 391 N.E.2d at 357, for the sole considerations for
commitment of unfit defendants.
122. The American Bar Foundation Commission on the Mentally Disabled recommends a
separate commitment procedure for persons found unrestorably incompetent to stand trial.
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due process clause directly oppose commitment of permanently handicapped
defendants for whom no treatment is available. 123 Therefore, the Lang de-
cision is contrary to the due process requirements as mandated by the
Jackson decision.
4. Procedural Safeguards
In further support of its holding, the Lang court emphasized the pro-
cedural safeguards provided in the commitment and unfitness statutes. 124
First, the court observed that a defendant has the right, under the Unified
Code of Corrections, to a periodic review of his or her unfitness. 125 Sec-
ondly, it also noted that upon filing of a petition for discharge, an unfit
defendant who is no longer subject to involuntary admission as defined in
the MHDD Code12 6 is eligible for release on bail.127 Finally, the Lang
court remarked that Illinois courts have granted the incompetent defendant
an "innocent only" hearing, a trial given to an unfit defendant to determine
whether he or she in fact committed the offense or should be released as
innocent. 128
Fairness implies that a defendant should, not be detained unless given an
opportunity to show that he or she may in fact be innocent or that he or she
may have an adequate defense. 129 These innocent only hearings, however,
Under this proceeding, only defendants who have been charged with specified crimes of vio-
lence could be committed. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
specified offense and proof that he or she presents a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to
others would be required for commitment. Unlike the present civil commitment procedure, this
scheme would not require that the condition for which the person was committed be amenable
to treatment. MDLR, supra note 37, at 631.
123. 406 U.S. at 738. See notes 35-39 and accompanying text supra.
124. 76 I11. 2d at 328-29, 391 N.E.2d at 357.
125. The court shall review his or her unfitness ninety days after the original finding of
unfitness, each twelve months thereafter, and upon petition of either the state or the defendant.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(b) (1977).
126. In order for an unfit defendant to be classified as not subject to involuntary commit-
ment, the court must find that he or she is not dangerous. 76 I11. 2d at 329, 391 N.E.2d at 357.
Any person hospitalized pursuant to the MHDD Code may petition for discharge. If the court
finds that he or she is not subject to involuntary admission, the court shall enter an order so
finding. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91 , §§ 3-900(a), 3-901 (Supp. 1978).
127. If the unfit defendant no longer requires hospitalization, he or she shall be released on
bail or recognizance. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(b) (1977).
128. 76 I11. 2d at 329-30, 391 N.E.2d at 357. As authority to require these hearings, the court
relied on People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970), the Report's
recommendation to provide discharge hearings for unfit defendants, REPORT, supra note 77, at
184-85, and the Jackson Court's favorable comments on such hearings, 406 U.S. at 735-36. 76
I11. 2d at 329-30, 391 N.E.2d at 357. For other alternative proposals, see Model Penal Code 9
4.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) and JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 33, at 43-44.
129. United States v. Barnes, 175 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Cal. 1959), exemplifies the potential
unfairness of the incompetency plea that, ironically, has been mandated to protect the defend-
ant's rights. See generally Matthews, supra note 27, at 19. In Barnes, four defendants were
indicted for the same murder. Alleging a violation of their sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial, the charges against three of the defendants were dismissed. Despite his reliance on the
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may unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Tradition-
ally, a person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until proven
guilty. 130 In an innocent only hearing, however, if the defendant should fail
to establish his or her innocence, the individual almost certainly will be
incarcerated under the guise of civil commitment. 131
An unfit defendant attains the status of incompetency because of an inabil-
ity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his or her defense. 132 If
the defendant is so severely disabled, he or she could not establish inno-
cence in any kind of hearing. The Myers court suggested that special proce-
dures be followed to compensate for the defendant's handicap. 133 If such
compensating techniques are available in order to determine fairly if the
defendant is innocent, a court should proceed directly to trial in order to
guarantee substantial constitutional rights. 134
In Lang, the court held that the defendant had been given an innocent
only hearing to determine if he should be released as an innocent per-
son. 135 Lang's conviction was reversed by the appellate court due to the
absence of adequate procedures to compensate for Lang's disabilities. 136 The
supreme court, in Lang, failed to justify how this trial, without compensating
procedures, was a fair opportunity for Lang to establish his innocence. The
court, nevertheless, permitted the use of the conviction as evidence of his
dangerousness in order to effectuate commitment. 137 In theory, the inno-
cent only hearings are meant to be beneficial to the unfit defendant. In
reality, the state may utilize these hearings as evidence to establish danger-
ousness and, thus, facilitate commitment of such a person.
IMPACT
The court's holding in People v. Lang is not limited to the unique facts of
Donald Lang's experience. The decision may have a considerable impact oil
all unfit defendants. Contrary to the de-institutionalization movement, 138 the
Lang court has substantially increased the scope of persons who may be
130. ILL. CONST. art I, § 9.
131. See notes 80-83, 100-03, and accompanying text supra.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(a) (1977).
133. People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d at 287, 263 N.E.2d at 113 (compensating
techniques will vary from case to case depending on each defendant's particular handicap).
134. For examples of constitutional rights guaranteed in a trial see note 155 infra.
135. 76 I11. 2d at 330, 391 N.E.2d at 357-58.
136. People v. Lang, 26 III. App. 3d at 653, 325 N.E.2d at 308.
137. 76 I11. 2d at 331, 391 N.E.2d at 358.
138. Recently, there has been a national trend away from institutionalization. See generally
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 575-76; New York Ass'n For Retard. Ch., Inc. v. Carey,
393 F. Supp. 715, 716-18 (E. D.N.Y. 1975); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES, CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS:
LEGAL ISSUES OF CONFINEMENT, TREATMENT, AND RELEASE 4-6 (Public Health Service Pub.,
1976).
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committed 139 and has concurrently relaxed the standard for civil commit-
ment of unfit defendants. In essence, the court has eliminated one of the
two requirements-that of mental illness-for civil commitment of unfit
defendants. A determination of unfitness results in a classification of mental
illness for practically all defendants despite the fact that they do not meet
the requisite mental condition demanded by the MHDD Code. In addition,
the Lang court has suggested that the second requirement for
commitment-that of dangerousness-can be established by evidence of the
criminal charge. Thus, this decision is a retreat toward the pre-Jackson era
of automatic commitment for unfit defendants.
To prevent almost automatic, 140 and possibly indefinite, commitment, 141 a
lawyer or a client may intentionally fail to raise the issue of the defendant's
fitness. 142 Subsequently, the defendant would be tried despite the loss of
his or her constitutional right to be mentally present at his or her trial. 143
The Lang decision may encourage defendants to attempt to conceal an unfit
mental or physical condition and to take their chances at trial. Unlike a fit
defendant, a person determined as unfit faces almost certain detention for a
period that could equal the maximum sentence for the designated crime. 144
In addition, the Lang opinion offers none of the desperately needed
safeguards to end the potential abuse accompanying the unfitness proce-
A Report to the President's Commission on Mental Health recognized that people have a
right to be different without risking civil commitment because others disapprove of their way of
life. TASK PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, at 1446. The Task Panel Report recommended drastic
reform in the area of civil commitment and specifically suggested a modified abolition of civil
commitment. Under this proposal, the present civil commitment system would be virtually
abolished. Instead, there would be emergency confinement for a brief period for persons on the
verge of or in the process of engaging in suicidal behavior. Id. at 1445-46. The Report further
suggested that dangerous mentally ill persons and permanently incompetent defendants must be
accommodated through a restructuring of the criminal law or through partial reliance on the
mental health system. Id. at 1447.
139. See notes 80-83, 100-03, and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 80-83, 100-03, and accompanying text supra.
141. Unless a defendant becomes fit or is no longer dangerous, he or she will be confined for
the maximum sentence that could have been imposed for the crimes charged. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-2-2(c) (1977). His or her convicted counterpart, on the other hand, is eligible for
parole after twenty years, less time credited for good behavior. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1003-3-3 (1977.); People v. Phillips, 58 11. App. 3d 109, 112, 373 N.E.2d 1072, 1074 (3d Dist.
1978); People v. Doom, 48 I11. App. 3d 959, 962, 363 N.E.2d 457, 460 (3d Dist. 1977).
142. Arguably, the Canon of Ethics may prevent an attorney from failing to raise the issue of
a defendant's competency. See Gobert, supra note 13, at 667; A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 7-12, 7-27.
143. An incompetent is presumed to be mentally "absent" from trial. "The competency rule
• ..has deep roots in the common law as a by-product of the ban against trials in absentia; the
mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtoom, is in reality af-
forded no opportunity to defend himself." Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of
Criminal Defendants, 108 U. PENN. L. REV. 832, 834 (1960). For a history of the rule, see
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. at 940-46.
144. See note 141 supra.
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dure. 145 The decision will not prevent a prosecutor from detaining a
defendant solely because he or she fears that the defendant is a danger to
society. Even though the prosecutor may have insufficient evidence success-
fully to incarcerate the defendant through the trial and conviction procedure,
incarceration may be achieved through the unfitness and subsequent civil
commitment procedure. 146 The Lang decision invites prosecutors to utilize
the unfitness procedure to attain such a result.
If the Lang court had limited its holding to the unique set of facts of the
case and used its authority to define "mentally ill" on a case-by-case basis,
the detrimental effect on all unfit defendants could have been avoided. For
Donald Lang, the decision was beneficial. It enabled him to be released
from jail into a training program designed to render him fit to stand trial in
three to five years. 147 The decision, although limited, has considerable im-
pact on all unfit defendants. Thus, radical reform in this area of law should
be considered.
CONCLUSION
The abolition of the incompetency plea 148 would resolve the type of con-
flict faced by the Illinois judicial system in People v. Lang and would be in
the best interest of both the state and the permanently incompetent defen-
dant. 149  Under this proposal, a finding of unfitness would be grounds for a
trial continuance for a period to extend no longer than six months. During
this period, the state would provide resources to aid the defendant in achiev-
ing trial competence. 150 At the end of this rehabilitation period, the state
must either dismiss the charges or proceed to a trial despite the defendant's
unfitness. If the state chooses the latter, it must incorporate into the trial
any available procedures that would compensate for the defendant's hand-
icap. 151
145. See, e.g., Fitness for Trial, supra note 15, at 681; Matthews, supra note 27, at 89-100;
Chernoff v. Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
505, 515-16 (1972); Lewin, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Legal and Ethical Aspects of an
Abused Doctrine 1969 LAw & ORDER 233.
The American Bar Foundation Commission on the Mentally Disabled questioned whether a
prosecutor should be allowed to raise the issue of a defendant's competency in light of the
potential for abuse. MDLR, supra note 37, at 620.
146. For an example of such abuse of the unfitness and subsequent civil commitment proce-
dure see Gobert, supra note 13, at 664-65 (the history of S.D.N.Y. (1970)); Fitness for Trial,
supra note 15, at 682-83 n.35.
147. 76 I11. 2d at 321-22, 391 N.E.2d at 353-54.
148. Burt & Morris, supra note 82.
149. Id. at 67. The state has a legitimate interest in confining dangerous persons. The unfit
defendant also has an interest in contesting his or her dangerousness and having its factual basis
rigorously proven. The risk that the commitment procedure will be misused in order to protect
society would be sharply reduced under the proposed scheme. The criminal trial is more likely
to protect a person against unwarranted confinement. Id. at 73.
150. Id. at 67.
151. Id.
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Incarcerating a defendant through the regular trial and conviction proce-
dure is preferable to "incarcerating" him or her through civil commitment.
Unless a defendant establishes innocence at an "innocent only" hearing, it is
possible that he or she will be "incarcerated" through commitment for a
period equal to the maximum sentence of the crime. 152 Under the trial and
conviction procedure, a defendant is guaranteed certain constitutional and
procedural safeguards not guaranteed to unfit defendants under the present
statutory scheme. 153 The Illinois Legislature has failed to provide the statu-
tory solution;1 5 4 consequently, the court has resorted to stretching the new
commitment statute in an effort to accommodate such persons, and in so
doing, the court has violated the equal protection and due process clauses.
Lynn LaDouceur Cagney
152. See note 143 supra.
153. A fit defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial by virtue of the sixth amend-
ment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The hearing to determine a defendant's fitness tolls the running
of the statutory trial period. People v. Williams, 48 I11. App. 3d 842, 849, 362 N.E. 2d 1306,
1312 (1st Dist. 1977); People v. Bickham, 39 Ill. App. 3d 358, 362, 350 N.E.2d 351, 354 (5th
Dist. 1976).
A fit defendant is guaranteed a trial by jury. If the issue of competency is raised after the trial
has commenced, that defendant is not allowed a jury to determine that issue. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-2-1(d) (1977); People v. Welsh, 30 I11. App. 3d 887, 333 N.E.2d 572 (2d Dist.
1975); People v. White, 131 I11. App. 2d 652, 264 N.E.2d 228 (3d Dist. 1970); People v.
Reaves, 412 Il. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861 (1952); Council Commentary, supra note 15.
A fit defendant is incarcerated only if a jury convicts him or her of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-1 (1977). An unfit defendant, on the other hand,
is incarcerated through the commitment procedure if clear and convincing evidence establishes
that the person is dangerous. In re Whitehouse, 56 Ill. App. 3d 245, 249, 371 N.E.2d 990, 993
(5th Dist. 1977). Cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. at 1095 (proof beyond a reasonable
doubt). There is only probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2(a) (1977). Yet, evidence of this crime can be used as a basis for the
medical opinion that the person is dangerous. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
154. The Lang court noted that the Illinois General Assembly is presently considering legisla-
tion that provides for some procedural changes in the present unfitness statute. 76 Ill. 2d at
327, 391 N.E.2d at 356. This Bill, S. 0133, 81st Gen. Assembly, 1979 Sess. (Introduced Feb-
ruary 15, 1979), however, does not discuss the disposition of the unfit but uncommittable de-
fendant.
The
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